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TERM OF THE COURT
come of a multistate financial organization is constitutionally ap-
portioned to the states in which the business is transacted and from
which the income is derived is presently being considered by the





The Wisconsin Supreme Court with two major decisions this
term, has continued a trend to expand the products liability field
which began with its decision in Dippel v. Sciano.1 The Dippel case
adopted the rule of strict liability in tort as set forth in the Restate-
ment (2d) of Torts, sec. 402A 2 stating that privity of contract
should not be used to defeat a claim based on a defective product
unreasonably dangerous to a nonprivity consumer. However, the
court's decision in Dippel limited its holding to the black letter rule
of the Restatement. The court reasoned that while the comments
of the Restatement reporters may be helpful in construing the
section, the comments were not adopted in order to allow the
concept of strict liability to develop within the context of existing
law in this state. The court was called upon this term to consider
the applicability of strict liability in a suit by an injured bystander
against the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product in the
case of Howes v. Hanson.3 In addition the court considered the
liability of a component part maker and the method of apportion-
ing damages among parties in the distributive chain of a product
in City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales.4
1. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
2. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which itis sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
3. 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
4. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
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In Howes a two year old boy had his foot come into contact
with the blade of a riding lawn mower resulting in serious injuries
including amputation of his foot. The mower involved was manu-
factured by Deere & Co., owned by the adult son of the landlord,
and operated at the time of the injury by a twelve year old neighbor
boy hired to do the lawn work. The case squarely presented the
issue: "Should an action based on strict liability be extended to
injured bystanders?"5 The issue was raised on demurrer by Deere
& Co. on the basis of plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action
sounding in strict liability in tort since the complaint failed to
allege the injured boy to be a user or consumer of the product. The
trial court overruled the demurrer and on appeal the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held:
The same reasons that prompted us in Dippel to adopt the con-
cept of strict liability to users or consumers cause us now to
extend that concept to bystanders.*** There is no essential differ-
ence between the injured user or consumer and the injured by-
stander.'
In arriving at its decision the Wisconsin court relied on the
classic opinion by Justice Traynor of California in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 7 stating that:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to a human being."
The Howes decision changed the emphasis in the quoted language
so as to accord the words "human being" their full meaning with-
out qualification. As first construed in Dippel strict liability was
limited to users or consumers.' The court further stated in Howes
that the reasoning which caused the court to adopt strict liability
initially is equally applicable to its extension to protect bystanders.
Concluding that there was no essential difference between users
and consumers and bystanders, the court considered: concern must
be for the just claims of the injured, the seller is in the best position
to distribute the costs of risks created by-his defective products, the
5. Howes v. Hanson, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 252, 201 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1972).
6. Id. at 254-255, 201 N.W.2d at 828.
7. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 987 (1963).
8. Howes v. Hanson, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 252, 201 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1972).
9. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 456, 155 N.W.2d 55, 61 (1967).
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manufacturer has the greatest ability to control the risk created by
his product, and the seller may pass the cost on to the consumer
by increased prices or may purchase insurance for protection.'0
Appellant made several arguments urging the court not to ex-
tend strict liability. It was contended that the concept of cost
spreading or distribution does not apply to bystanders since they
are not in the distributive chain. The court in rejecting this conten-
tion stated that the theory of compensation in strict liability is one
of tort and the cost distribution concept runs counter to basic tort
theory by urging that the injured party should share in paying for
the recovery he seeks. Another argument offered was that implied
representation by the manufacturer of safety and quality was not
intended for the bystander. Warranty theory cannot be relied on
to deny recovery under strict liability since Dippel abrogated the
privity requirement and an attempt to avoid liability based on
representations of safety and reliability disregards the fact that
"users" and "consumers'''' are not necessarily those customers to
whom the representations have been made. The appellant-
manufacturer further contended that an extension of strict liability
would expose sellers to liability to an unlimited and unforeseeable
class of nonusers and bystanders. The court pointed out that such
a contention was simply untrue and emphasized the elements of
proof required by the plaintiff. While the plaintiff is not required
to prove specific acts of negligence, proof must be had to establish:
(1) that a defective condition existed when the product left the
manufacturer; (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous; (3) that the
defect was a cause of plaintiff's injuries; (4) that seller engaged in
the business of selling; and (5) that the product reached the plaintiff
without substantial change in condition.' 2 The seller further has the
defense of contributory negligence available as the plaintiff has the
duty to use ordinary care to protect himself from a known or
readily apparent danger. 3 Also conduct which may have been
termed as assumption of risk prior to McConville v. State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co.'4 may constitute a second type of con-
tributory negligence.
10. Howes v. Hanson, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 201 N.W.2d 825, 828-829 (1972).
II. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (1) at 354 (1965).
12. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
13. Defenses available under contributory negligence might include misuse of the prod-
uct, abuse or alteration of the product, natural wear, use of the product coupled with
inherent danger.
14. 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
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The Howes decision reiterated the Dippel principles as the Wis-
consin strict liability doctrine. It must be noted that this approach
is at odds with the Restatement sec. 402A. The Restatement takes
the approach that "(s)ince the liability . . . is not based upon
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to
strict liability cases applies."' 5 Wisconsin has rejected the Restate-
ment in this respect in order to implement strict liability under the
comparative negligence statute. 6 The court has stated:
It might be contended that strict liability of the seller of a defec-
tive product is not negligence and therefore cannot be compared
with the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The liability
imposed is not grounded upon a failure to exercise ordinary care
with its necessary element of foreseeability; it is much more akin
to negligence per se * ** Comparison of the failure to exercise
ordinary care and negligence per se is so common and widely
approved in our jurisdiction as to need no citation. 7
The problems of terminology and semantic difficulty surround-
ing the adoption of strict liability as negligence per se caused then
Justice Hallows to concur in Dippel and clarify a somewhat mis-
leading stance of the court:
The Restatement is in terms of liability, but if we are to keep
the doctrine of comparative negligence, which is one of the bul-
warks against strict liability in Wisconsin jurisprudence, our
statement of the first step in the solution of product liability cases
must clearly be in terms of negligence and not liability. It is a
plainly misleading statement to say we adopt the strict liability
rule but we do not mean it.
What we mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of
sec. 402A, Restatement, Torts 2d, in Wisconsin is guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law and such negligence is subject to the
ordinary rules of causation and the defense applicable to negli-
gence. While the Restatement, Torts 2d, sec. 402A, imposes a
strict or absolute liability regardless of the negligence of the
seller, we do not."8
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (n) at 356 (1965).
16. WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1971): Contributory Negligence. Contributory negligence
shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negli-
gence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
17. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 461-462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967).
18. Id. at 464, 155 N.W.2d at 65-66.
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The Wisconsin approach to strict liability as negligence per se,
gave rise to the question of the appropriate means for apportioning
negligence between parties in the distributive chain of the product
where each party is strictly liable or negligent per se. In City of
Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales,19 the plaintiff city brought
suit against the seller, the chassis maker, and the wheel maker
under strict liability for the sale to the city of a fire truck with a
defective wheel. The fire truck was damaged when it tipped over
while turning a corner responding to a fire alarm.
The question of apportioning damages required initial consid-
eration of whether a component part manufacturer may be strictly
liable in tort. While the Restatement abstained from expressing an
opinion on the matter, it did indicate that the question was essen-
tially whether "responsibility for discovery and prevention of the
dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to
make the changes. ' 29 The court recognized that there is a split in
authority among the jurisdictions as to the liability of component
part manufacturers21 and then held that:
Where there is no change in the component part itself, but it is
merely incorporated into something larger, and where the cause
of harm or injury is found, as here, to be a defect'in the compo-
nent part, we hold that as to the ultimate user or consumer, the
strict liability standard applies to the maker and supplier of the
defective part.22
19. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (q) at 358 (1965).
(q) Component parts. The same problem arises in cases of the sale of a compo-
nent part of a product to be assembled by another, as for example a tire to be placed
on a new automobile, a brake cyclinder for the same purpose, or an instrument for
the panel of an airplane. Again the question arises, whether the responsibility is not
shifted to the assembler. It it is no doubt to be expected that where there is no change
in the component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the
strict liability will be found to carry through to the ultimate user or consumer. But
in the absence of a sufficient number of decisions on the matter to justify a conclu-
sion, the Institute expresses no opinion on the matter.
21. Cf. holding the component part maker liable: Burbage v. Boiler Engineering &
Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 503 (1969); Suveda v. White Motor Co., 311 I11. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2nd Cir. 1963); Putman
v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); absolving the component part maker
of liability: Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960);
Goldberg v. Killsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963).




In obiter dicta the court indicated that further processing or sub-
stantial change, or where the injury is not caused by a defect in the
component part, might have yielded a different result. Thus the
same policy considerations for loss distribution justifying imposi-
tion of strict liability on any manufacturer may be applied to a
component part maker with a caveat as to the degree of change
such part undergoes.
The question then turns to the mechanism for comparing negli-
gence between parties in the distributive chain each of which is
negligent per se under the requisite elements of Dippel and Howes.
In the City of Franklin case the special verdict contained a com-
parative negligence question asking only what percentage of negli-
gence was to be attributed to the city and what percentage to the
defendants.? The problem arises here in that while in a strict
liability action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish liability
against the seller, assembler and maker without regard to the exer-
cise of due care of each of these defendants, it is insufficient in a
case involving multiple defendants not to question the jury as to
the allocation of negligence between such defendants in order to
determine the rights of contribution between them. The court held
that "(t)he failure to submit a question as to the comparative
23. The special verdict used in this case [by the trial court], in pertinent part, reads as
follows:
First question: Was the wheel in question, when it was delivered to W.S. Darley
Company, constructed defectively so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospec-
tive user?
Second question: If you have answered 'Yes' to Question No. 1, then answer this
question; otherwise do not answer it: Was such defective construction a cause of the
accident in question?
Third question: Was the plaintiff, the City of Franklin, negligent with respect to
(a) The maintenance of the wheel?
(b) The operation of the vehicle?
Fourth question: If you have answered 'Yes' to any subdivision of Question No. 3,
then answer the corresponding subdivision of this question: Was such negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, the City of Franklin, a cause of the accident with respect to
(a) The maintenance of the wheel?
(b) The operation of the vehicle?
The special verdict, as to comparative causal negligence of the city and the defendants, reads
as follows:
Fifth question: If you have answered both Question No. I and Question No. 2 'Yes',
then such defect in construction constitutes causal negligence. If you have answered
'Yes' to Question No. 2 and 'Yes' to either or both subdivisions of Question No. 4,
then answer this question; otherwise do not answer it: Taking 100 percent as a total,
what percentage of negligence do you attribute to
(a) The defective condition of the wheel?
(b) The plaintiff, the City of Franklin?
Id. notes 9-10 at 651, 207 N.W.2d notes 9-10 at 870-871.
[Vol. 57
TERM OF THE COURT
negligence of the individual defendants, on the issue of contribution
between them, renders the verdict incomplete. '2 4
The question in Wisconsin is not whether a defendant is negli-
gent in selling a defectively dangerous product, but, rather, did he
sell it?2 1 If the basic fact of sale is found, then the court must
transpose the fact in terms of negligence for the purpose of com-
parison. Therefore, where the plaintiff establishes the elements of
strict liability against a manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer each
party is causally negligent. This conclusion would preclude the
shifting of total responsibility from one party in the distributive
chain to another but allows sharing of responsibility between the
parties. A proper jury verdict must then apportion some percen-
tage of negligence to each of the parties defendant. The Wisconsin
rule thereby precludes indemnity but allows contribution. This re-
sult creates a conceptual dilemma in that an innocent seller, whole-
saler or assembler is forced to bear some of the burden for the
defective product although their conduct may not be considered
factually negligent, while to allow a party who is negligent as a
matter of law to escape liability is incongruous with the philosophy
of strict liability. The conclusion that indemnity is unavailable as
a means of shifting the loss in its entirety in products litigation is
strengthened by Wisconsin's rejection of the distinction of active
and passive negligence26 which has traditionally been used as a
criterion for granting indemnity between tortfeasors.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The court was called on this term to make a number of deci-
sions having a significant impact on medical malpractice litigation.
Among its decisions the court refused to adopt the "discovery
rule" with respect to the running of the statute of limitations; the
"locality rule" was modified to make the geographic area in which
a doctor practices only a factor to be considered in establishing his
standard of care; the cause of action in situations involving the
"informed consent" of the patient is now recognized under a negli-
gence theory; and the rule respecting release of the initial tortfeasor
in situations where there is subsequent malpractice will not operate
to release the malpracticing doctor unless intent to release the
24. Id. at 654, 207 N.W.2d at 872.
25. Wis. J.I.-Civil 3920 (Comment).




doctor is found in the instrument. The medical malpractice cases
required the court to re-examine issues with long standing preced-
ent, thus indicating the trend toward increased litigation in this
area and the need to conform legal standards to present day medi-
cal practices.
A. The Locality Rule
Whether the "locality rule" in medical malpractice in Wiscon-
sin should be abrogated both as to general practitioners and spe-
cialists tests a rule followed for over 80 years. 27 A long line of
Wisconsin cases requires that testimony of an expert must establish
the standard of care of the allegedly malpracticing doctor in rela-
tion to the community where the defendant practices:
When a physician exercises that degree of care, judgment, and
skill which physicians in good standing of the same school of
medicine usually exercise in the same or similar localities under
like or similar circumstances, having due regard to the advanced
state of medical science at the time, he has discharged his legal
duty to his patient." [Emphasis added]
Practitioners in medicine, surgery or osteopathy who were licensed
in other states could testify as experts in Wisconsin whenever their
testimony was necessary to establish the rights of Wisconsin citi-
zens or residents in a judicial proceeding and whenever expert
testimony of licensed practitioners in Wisconsin, sufficient for the
purpose, was not available, by virtue of the terms of a special
statute pertaining to medical testimony until 1953 when the statute
was amended to delete the particular provision. 9 Wisconsin has
also recognized that a physician or surgeon is competent to testify
where such testimony indicates familiarity with the practice of
medicine and customs of the profession in the vicinity of the defen-
dant's locality," or that the witness had knowledge of practice in
27. Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 30 N.W. 674 (1886).
28. Ahola v. Sincock, 6 Wis. 2d 332, 94 N.W.2d 566 (1959): Keuhnemann v. Boyd,
193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326, 215 N.W. 455 (1927); Jaeger v. Stratton, 170 Wis. 579, 176
N.W. 61 (1920); McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 519, 175 N.W.2d 230 (1970).
29. WIs. STAT. § 147.14(2) (1971). That portion of the statute applicable in this instance
reads as follows:
Practitioners in medicine, surgery or osteopathy licensed in other states may
testify as experts in this state when such testimony is necessary to establish the rights
of citizens or residents of this state in a judicial proceeding and expert testimony of
licensed practitioners of this state sufficient for the purpose are not available.
Also see Paulson v. Gunderson, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 488 (1935); Morrill v. Komasinski
256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
30. Allen v. Voji, 114 Wis. I, 89 N.W. 924 (1902).
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communities similar to the community in which the defendant
practiced irrespective of the statute.3 1 However, the Wisconsin
cases uniformly required testimony with respect to the standards
in the area in which the defendant practiced, regardless of the
method used to establish the competency of the witness.
The so-called "locality rule" was challenged by Shier v.
Freedman32 where a 21 year old construction worker was injured
when a 20 to 30 pound clump of dirt fell on his back fracturing
two vertabrae in the lumbar spine. After initially conservative
treatment, surgery was first performed by Dr. Richard Ouden-
hoven, a neurosurgeon, to alleviate persistent pain in the low back
and right leg. The back pain remained and plaintiff consulted Dr.
Albert Freedman, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed a spinal
fusion. During recovery the plaintiff first complained of numbness
in the right buttock and then loss of feeling throughout the saddle
area, anal area, penis and testicles. Dr. Oudenhoven, who was
called in as a consultant by Dr. Freedman and who then performed
exploratory surgery to determine what the problem was and how
it could be rectified, testified at trial that in his opinion, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Freedman failed to
meet the standard of medical practice in Brown County or the
same or similar surrounding localities. A number of medical ex-
perts were called and testified that Dr. Freedman was not negli-
gent. At the close of testimony plaintiff's counsel submitted as a
requested instruction Wisconsin J.I.-Civil, Part I, sec. 1023 on
malpractice with the locality rule deleted. The requested instruc-
tion was rejected and the instruction was given in standard form.
On appeal the question presented is, in essence, whether a physi-
cian, surgeon or dentist from one locality is competant to testify
as to the standard of care required of a practitioner from another
locality.
The Wisconsin Court in Shier rejected the locality rule and
stated the new rule as follows:
Henceforth, in instructing juries in medical malpractice cases,
the jury should be told in substance that a qualified medical (or
dental) practitioner, be he a general practitioner or a specialist,
should be subject to liability in an action for negligence if he fails
to exercise that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the
average practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in
31. Morrill v. Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
32. 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
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the same or similar circumstances. Geographical area and its
attendant lack of facilities are circumstances that can be consid-
ered if appropriate."
In rejecting the locality rule the Court pointed out that the
rationale formerly used to justify the standard is inappropriate in
our advanced technical society. At the time the rule originated it
simply was unfair to hold a physician from a small town who
lacked the opportunity to become acquainted with technical ad-
vances and who did not have modern facilities for care and treat-
ment to the same standard of care as physicians from the urban
centers. The Court relied on the Washington case of Pederson v.
DumonchePl in adopting the trend away from a standard of care
based on geographical localities now recognized by a number of
jurisdictions. 35 The reasoning behind this trend is essentially that
the old rule has outlived its usefulness with the passage of time and
the disappearance of the "country doctor" from the profession,
availability of programs of continuing education, regulation of the
medical profession by standardized certification procedures, and a
tendancy to recognize the degree of care of the average, competant
practitioner.
The decision has left a number of questions unanswered. First,
the scope of the opinion was limited to medical and dental practi-
tioners. One must then question the effect of Shier respecting fa-
miliarity with local practices for witnesses testifying in medically
related professions such as technicians, hygenists and also chiro-
practors, physical therapists, and the like. The standard of care for
hospitals is also established by the care given in similar circumstan-
ces by hospitals in the geographic area. Whether Shier will be
extended to include hospitals and medically related professions is
left to future litigation. Secondly, the effect of the decision on the
statutes relating to expert medical testimony is uncertain. Wiscon-
sin Statute sec. 448.02(2) allows an out of state practitioner to
33. Id. at 283-284, 206 N.W.2d at 174,
34. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
35. See Naccardo v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1972); Brune v. Belinhoff,
354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d
159 (1967); McElroy v. Frast, 268 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1954); Carbone v. Warburton, II N.J.
418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950);
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hospital, 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941); Annot., 37
A.L.R.3d 420 (1972). See also Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949), indicating
possible approval of a broader rule.
36. See Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial Hospital, 45 Wis. 2d 147, 172 N.W.2d 427
(1969).
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testify where he is the examining or attending physician and also
provides that expert status is granted in the discretion of the trial
courtY.3  This section must be read in conjunction with Wisconsin
Statute sec. 907.02 of the new Wisconsin Rules of Evidence relat-
ing to expert testimony.38 The statutes indicate that recognition of
a medical expert is within the ambit of the trial court's discretion.
The expert medical witness is called upon to establish the standard
of care, that the standard was breached, and that the breach caused
the injury. In accomplishing this Shier holds that geographic area
is still a factor in establishing the standard of care and the compe-
tency of the witness to testify with respect to that standard. To
preclude a medical expert from testifying it must now be shown
that locality is a factor which must be considered in resolving the
issue, and that the witness is not familiar with local practice. From
the rationale of the decision it may be that locality will be a factor
only where it involves availability of facilities.
B. Statute of Limitations
Litigation in the area of medical malpractice included three
cases concerning the statutory limitations placed on commencing
suit. Olsen v. St. Croix Valley Memorial HospitaP9 and Peterson
v. Roloff0 reexamined the issue of whether the statute of limita-
tions should begin to run at the time of the injury or at the time
of its discovery. Estate of Kohls41 considered the appropriate limi-
37. WIS. STAT. § 448.02(2)(a) (1971) provides that:
No person without a license or certificate of registration from the examining board
shall have the right to testify in a professional capacity on a subject relating to
medical treatment, as a medical or osteopathic physician or practitioner of any other
form or system of treating the sick, as defined in s. 445.01. A medical or osteopathic
physician, licensed to practice in another state, may testify as the attending or
examining physician or surgeon to the care, treatment, examination or condition of
sick or injured persons whom he has treated in the ordinary course of his professional
practice for the sickness or injury which is the subject of the judicial inquiry in any
action or proceeding in which he is called as a witness.
(b) A court may permit any person to testify as an expert on a medical
subject in any action or judicial proceeding where proof is offered satisfactory
to the court that such person is qualified as such expert.
38. Sec. 907.02 Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d RI, 207 N.W.2d -(1973)
(Testimony by Experts):
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
39. 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972).
40. 57 Wis. 2d I, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973).
41. 57 Wis. 2d 141, 203 N.W.2d 666 (1973).
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tation on a malpractice action brought on a contract theory. The
Court in these cases relied on past precedent and deferred to the
legislature any changes that may be deemed necessary.
The Olson case was appealed from the trial court ruling sus-
taining a demurrer to a complaint alleging malpractice against a
hospital for injuries sustained as a result of a transfusion of impro-
perly typed blood. The transfusion was administered in 1962.
Plaintiff, in 1966, gave birth to a child who died shortly after birth,
and, in 1969, delivered a stillborn child. At the time of the second
delivery it was discovered that the wrong blood was given in the
1962 transfusion. The complaint alleged the negligent mistyping
and administering of the blood was the direct and proximate cause
of the loss of plaintiff's children. The demurrer was sustained based
on the running of the three year statute of limitations."
The supreme court affirmed on the ground that the statute of
limitations barred the suit and cited Holifield v. Setco Industries,
Inc.13 as authority for its position that the period commences to
run at the time the cause of action accrues. The cause accrues at
the time the plaintiff is injured; injury is not necessarily simulta-
neous with the negligent act. The court held that the plaintiff was
injured in 1962 at the time of the transufsion and action brought
in 1969 was barred. The Olson case was determined to be factually
inappropriate for re-examination of the "discovery rule" pre-
viously rejected in Wisconsin.4"
The Peterson case arose out of allegedly negligent surgery for
the removal of plaintiff's gallbladder in 1954. In January of 1971
plaintiff experienced pains in her abdomen diagnosed as pancreati-
tis due to the failure of the defendant doctor to completely remove
the gallbladder. The question considered on appeal was at what
time did the cause of action ripen so as to start the running of the
statute of limitations. The plaintiff-appellant contended that Wis-
consin should adopt the "discovery rule" so that the period of
limitation would not commence until the injury resulting from the
alleged negligence was discovered. The court retained the present
rule that a medical "malpractice action accrues at the time the
negligent act occurs with accompanying injury."45 The court went
42. WIS. STAT. § 893.205(I) (1971) and Wis. STAT. § 893.14 (1971).
43. 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
44. Reistad v. Manz, I I Wis. 2d 155, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1960), McCluskey v. Thranow,
31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1969); Volk v. McCormick, 41 Wis. 2d 654, 165 N.W.2d
185 (1969).
45. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 203 N.W.2d 699, 700-01.
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on to state that a change of the statute of limitations is one of
public policy which should be left to the legislature. Noting that
statute of limitations questions present the conflicting policies of
discouraging stale and fraudulent claims and allowing valid claim-
ants an opportunity to seek redress when diligently pursued, the
court concluded-
Because of the numerous cases in which the present three-year
requirement for commencing an action by a party who is the
victim of medical malpractice is too short, we strongly recom-
mend to the legislature that the basic three-year statute for negli-
gence actions due to medical malpractice be amended.46
Chief Justice Hollows wrote a strong dissent in Peterson chas-
tising the majority for placing the discovery rule in Wisconsin "in
the limbo of jurisprudence. . . to be saved, if at all, by the legisla-
ture."47 The dissent characterized the issue as one of statutory
construction significant enough to be decided by the court.
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice in Wisconsin
depends on when a cause of action is said to "accrue." 4 The term
"cause of action" is not statutorily defined. "A cause of action
accrues when there exists a claim capable of present enforcement,
a suitable party against whom it may be enforced, and a party who
has a present right to enforce it.""4 Since a cause of action requires
the elements of a duty, breach, cause and damage to be present
before it can be said to have accrued, it is inappropriate to force
an aggrieved party to initiate a cause of action when that party is
unaware of its existence. The "discovery rule" attempts to avoid
the inequities in just such a situation. Under this doctrine, the
cause of action does not accrue until the victim knows or should
have known of the injury. A number of jurisdictions have adopted
the rule through interpretation of existing statutes framed in terms
of when a cause of action "accrued." 5 The Wisconsin Court has
46. Id. at 7, 203 N.W.2d at 702.
47. Id. at 15-16, 203 N.W.2d at 707.
48. WIs. STAT. § 893.14 (1971).
Actions, time for commencing. The following actions must be commenced within the
periods respectively hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action has accrued
except that the period shall not be considered to have expired when the court before
which the action is pending shall be satisfied that the person originally served know-
ingly gave false information to the officer with intent to mislead him in the perform-
ance of his duty in the service of any summons or civil process. In the event the court
so finds the period of limitation shall be extended for one year.
49. Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750,754, 168 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1969).
50. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 203 N.W.2d 699, 705 (1973).
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on two previous occasions5 refused to adopt the discovery rule and
in McCluskey v. Thranow stated that "this question is not open
to new adjudication in Wisconsin. ' 2 While the court has retreated
somewhat from its position in McCluskey it has refused to take
the necessary steps to effectuate a needed change that could be
accomplished by statutory construction.53
The Estate of Kohls presented the issue of whether the three-
year statute of limitations54 or the six-year statute of limitations5
applies where the complaint alleged that a result of treatment by
two dentists the deceased developed aplastic anemia which caused
her death. Plaintiff contended the theory of the action was based
on contract and the six-year statute was applicable. The court
relied on Klingbeil v. Sauceman5" in holding that:
While a malpractice action can be brought either in tort or in
contract, it is an action to recover damages for injuries to per-
son. . . .The appellant has an option as to remedies, but, which-
ever route he chooses, the "action for injuries" statute of limita-
tions (sec. 893.205, the three-year statute) applies.5 7
In so holding, the court rejected another theory by which the time
for commencing malpractice suits may have been extended, thus
committing the issue to the will of the legislature.
C. Informed Consent
In Trogun v. Fruchtman, 8 the court discarded the doctrine of
"implied consent" based upon a theory of assault and battery. The
plaintiff was a patient of Dr. Robert Fruchtman, a specialist in
internal medicine. The doctor prescribed a certain drug, isoniozid
hydrazate (INH) for treatment of an inactive tuberculosis condi-
tion. After taking the INH, plaintiff became jaundiced and con-
51. Reistad v. Manz, I I Wis. 2d 155, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1960); McCluskey v. Thranow,
31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
52. McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
53. See, Hallows dissent in Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 203 N.W.2d 699, 706
(1973).
54. WIs. STAT. § 893.205 (1971):
Within 3 years: (1) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person for such
injuries sustained on and after July 1, 1955...
55. WIs. STAT. § 893.19 (1971).
Within 6 years: (3) An action upon any other contract, obligation or liability, express
or implied ....
56. 165 Wis. 60, 160 N.W.2d 1051 (1917).
57. Estate of Kohls, 57 Wis. 2d 141, 144, 203 N.W.2d 666, 667-668 (1973).
58. 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
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tracted hepatitis which required surgery. The plaintiff alleged as a
second cause of action that the doctor failed to advise him of
possible side effects of the drugs prescribed and therefore plaintiff
could not make an informed consent to such treatment.
On appeal the crux of plaintiff-appellant's request to the court
was a modification of the existing law which has become known
as the doctrine of "informed consent." Informed consent concerns
the duty of the physician or surgeon to inform the patient of the
risk which may be involved. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
adopted a theory in the consent cases based on the traditional
intentional tort of battery which is defined as the unauthorized
touching of another. 5 The battery rule was adopted in two early
cases. Throne v. Wandell ° held a person in possession of his facul-
ties and in sufficient physical health to be consulted about his
condition must be so consulted in non-emergency situations and
failure to do so is technically a battery. Paulson v. Gunderson6
held, in essence, that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
clear preponderance of the evidence that an operation was per-
formed without consent and if it was, the physician committed a
battery.
The court pointed to several reasons why the assault and bat-
tery theory is inadequate in the informed consent situations:
(1) the act complained of "does not fit comfortably within the
traditional concepts of battery;"
(2) failure to inform is probably not an intentional act within
the traditional intentional tort concept;
(3) the act complained of is not "contact" or "touching," i.e.,
drug treatment;
(4) whether the physician's malpractice insurance covers "lia-
bility for an arguably 'criminal act' ";
(5) these cases do not present situations where punitive dam-
ages can be awarded."2
Thus, the court concluded that the action is in reality one for
negligent failure to conform to the proper standard of disclosure.
The new Wisconsin informed consent rule is summarized as
follows:
We conclude that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to estab-
59. Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 18 at 30 (1965).
60. 176 Wis. 97, 186 N.W. 146 (1922).
61. 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
62. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 599-600, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (1973).
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lish a physician's failure to disclose particular risk information
in connection with contemplated treatment, the patient's lack of
knowledge of that risk and the adverse effects upon him which
followed that treatment. Experts are unnecessary to establish the
materiality of the risk to a patient's decision to undergo treat-
ment or to the "reasonably expectable effect of risk disclosure
on the decision." Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie
showing of a failure of the physician to inform the patient, the
physician must come forward with his explanation of the reasons
for not so informing the patient, including evidence that such
advice was not customarily given.A
In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on the ratonale of
three cases from other jurisdictions, Canterbury v. Spence," Cobbs
v. Grant,65 and Wilkinson v. Vesey. 6 The court noted that the
Canterbury case recognized exceptions to the duty to disclose
where the patient is incapable of consenting, where an emergency
situation is presented, and where the risk of disclosure poses a
threat to the patient such that it is unfeasible from a medical
standpoint. Wilkinson indicates that there is no need for a physi-
cian to disclose well-known risks or to disclose all possible risks
to the patient. Other factors affecting the duty to disclose are: what
information is customarily disclosed; the nature of the explanation
and its understanding by the patient; and the proof in the hands of
the physician such as an authorization. Essentially a doctor must
give his patient an opportunity to make an informed judgment
based on the facts of each situation.
D. Releases
The court was called upon this term to reconsider an apparently
well settled aspect of the law affecting medical malpractice, that
being whether a release by an injured party of the original tortfea-
sor for his injury will bar an action by the injured party for later
negligent diagnosis and treatment by a physician or surgeon. This
issue was presented in both Krenz v. Medical Protective Co., 7 and
Westphal v. Cantwell-Peterson Clinic.68 The Krenz case also in-
volved the propriety of amending an executed release.
63. Id. at 604, 207 N.W.2d at 315.
64. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
65. 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
66. 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
67. 57 Wis. 2d 387, 204 N.W.2d 663 (1973).
68. 57 Wis. 2d 402, 204 N.W.2d 491 (1973).
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In Krenz, plaintiff was injured in a fall down a flight of stairs,
suit was brought against the owners of the premises and a year
later suit was also commenced against the treating physician and
his insurer. Subsequent to commencing the malpractice action a
general release was executed and the suit against the building own-
ers was dismissed. Upon learning of the release, the defendant
doctor and his insurer moved for summary judgment based on the
general release. The trial court denied the motion.
Westphal involved treatment following an automobile accident
where the plaintiff, a 17 year old, suffered complete and permanent
paraplegia. A minor settlement was negotiated with the driver of
the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, and general
releases were executed. The malpractice action was commenced
and the defendant doctors *answered setting forth the general re-
lease as an affirmative defense. The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment.
The initial consideration in the Krenz case was the effect of an
attempt to amend the executed general release. The amendment
procedure was instituted by plaintiff upon discovery that by opera-
tion of law a general release also released the malpractice cause
of action. The court held that the intent of the parties controlled:
A release is a unilateral contract and the intention of the parties
as to its scope and effect is relevant [citations omitted] . .. We
think the parties to a release can agree to amend their intention
or more precisely in the context of this case to exclude an effect
they did not intend. . . .The original release in effect gave him
[the doctor] a free ride without his knowledge, consent, or any
consideration as far as the Krenz's are concerned.69
The "free ride" given the doctor by barring the malpractice
action as a result of a general release executed to the original
tortfeasor, as well as the policy of encouraging settlement in proper
cases, seem to be the motivating factors for reconsideration of the
effect of releases in a case where medical malpractice aggrevates
an original injury.
The Wisconsin rule of long standing has been that "the en-
hancement of an injury resulting from malpractice is a direct result
of the original injury and consequently the tortfeasor causing the
original injury is liable, not only for the original injury but also for
subsequent aggrevation by malpractice."7
69. Krenz v. Medical Protective Co., 57 Wis. 2d 387, 391, 204 N.W.2d 663, 666 (1973).
70. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 49 at 301 (4th ed. 1971).
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A general release given to the tortfeasor responsible for the
original injury, in the absence of express language in the release
reserving a cause of action, precludes a malpractice action for
negligent treatment of the injury.7' However, in Pierringer v.
Hoger,"2 Wisconsin recognized a limited release in situations in-
volving joint tortfeasors. The agreement utilized to effectuate set-
tlement and to prevent its being precluded by a nonsettling defen-
dant provided essentially that the plaintiffs would release all of
their causes of action and credit and satisfy all of their damages
in any judgments which might ultimately be attributed to the set-
tling parties, reserving to the plaintiffs only the portion of their
cause of action and damages which might be held to be attributable
to the nonsettling party. Although the original tortfeasor and the
doctor are not joint tortfeasors, the principles of a Pierringer type
release would have been the appropriate means of protecting the
plaintiff's cause of action against the malpracticing doctor.
The Wisconsin rule respecting a release of the original tortfea-
sor where there is subsequent malpractice originated in Hooyman
v. Reeve,73 where the general release was deemed to have included
the damages for malpractice. In Retelle v. Sullivan,74 the language
of the general release was broad enough to release the doctor, and
the court justified its conclusion by stating that the first tortfeasor
received a subrogation right from the injured party against the
doctor to indemnify the first tortfeasor for the payment of damages
caused by the doctor-thus double recovery was avoided. The im-
plied release was further developed in Noll v. Nugent.75 The court
stated that there is a presumption that in releasing the original
tortfeasor the settlement includes compensation for the injury oc-
casioned by the malpractice, and the presumption is conclusive
unless the injured party saves his cause of action by an appropriate
provision in the release or covenant not to sue. Thereafter Green
v. Waters,7 and Hartley v. St. Francis Hospital,77 firmly estab-
71. Fisher v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180 N.W. 269
(1920); Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756 (1927); Noll v. Nugent, 214 Wis.
204, 252 N.W. 574 (1934); Green v. Waters, 260 Wis. 40, 49 N.W.2d 919 (1951); Hartley
v. St. Francis Hospital, 24 Wis. 2d 396, 129 N.W.2d 235, (1964).
72. 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); also see McComas, Tort Releases in
Wisconsin, 49 MARO. L. REV. 533 (1966).
73. 168 Wis. 420, 170 N.W. 282 (1919).
74. Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756 (1927).
75. 214 Wis. 2d 204, 252 N.W. 574 (1934).
76. Green v. Waters, 260 Wis. 40, 49 N.W.2d 919 (1951).
77. Hartley v. St. Francis Hospital, 24 Wis. 2d 396, 129 N.W.2d 235 (1964).
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lished the reservation of rights and concept of subrogation. It must
be noted that since the first tortfeasor and the doctor are not joint
tortfeasor there is no common liability giving rise to a right of
contribution. The first tortfeasor by settling acquires the right of
the injured party to sue the doctor.
The court in this term has enunciated a change in Wisconsin
law, the new rule respecting releases in cases where there is subse-
quent malpractice is now:
A rebuttable presumption that a general release of the original
tortfeasor does not release the malpractice cause of action
against the doctor for damages which might be recovered against
the original tortfeasor, unless the intention to do so is clearly and
expressly stated in the release. 8
The rationale of the rule is that the intent of the parties should
control. The effect of this decision is to place the burden of proof
on the doctor, who claims the benefit of the release, that he was
to be included in the release of the original tortfeasor.
Wisconsin is now added to the list of twelve jurisdictions8
which have adopted a release rule similar to that of Krenz. The
case law of these jurisdictions, cited by the court in its opinion,
generally considered the effect of the release based on two factors:
1) whether the injured party intended to release the physician by
releasing the original tortfeasor, and 2) whether the settlement in
fact compensated the injured party for the malpractice damage.
Wisconsin does not seem to have adopted the intent-to-release-
plus-full-compensation rule, but has created a presumption which
must be overcome by the doctor using the language of the instru-
ment. The question arises as to what evidence is sufficient to rebut
the presumption.
The Krenz case did not incorporate adequacy of consideration
78. Krenz v. Medical Protective Co., 57 Wis. 2d 387, 400-401, 204 N.W.2d 663, 670
(1973).
79. See, Ariz. Leech v. Bralliar, 275 F. Supp. 897 (D.C. Ariz. 1967); Cal.: Ash v.
Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944); Iowa: Smith v. Conn., 163 N.W.2d 407,
39 A.L.R.3d 251 (1968, Iowa); Georgia: Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 185 S.E.2d 915
(1971); Minn: Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, Inc., 253 Minn. 418,92 N.W.2d 96
(1958); Nev.: Hansen v. Collett, 79 Nev. 159, 380 P.2d 301 (1963); N.H.: Wheat v. Carter,
79 N.H. 150, 106 A. 602 (1919); N.J.: Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676, 69
A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958); N.Y.: Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187
N.E.2d 556 (1962); N.C.: Galloway v. Lawrence, 263 N.C. 433, 139 S.E.2d 761 (1965);
Tex.: McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971); Wash.: DeNike v. Mowery,
69 Wash. 2d 357, 148 P.2d 1010 (1966).
80. Westphal v. Cantwell-Peterson Clinic, 57 Wis. 2d 402, 204 N.W.2d 491 (1973).
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in its holding, but the amount of settlement was examined in
Westphal.! Relying on Krenz, the court in Westphal indicated that
"intent" includes both an intention to release and full compensa-
tion:
It would be ridiculous to argue that paying out $16,000 in return
for a general release and approved court settlement, given the
severity of plaintiff's injuries [the case involved injuries resulting
in quadreplegia], could in any way lead to the possibility of a
double recovery in malpractice litigation. We think there was no
intent to release the malpractice cause of action .... "I
In spite of these decisions the effectiveness of any release will
still depend on the terms of the instrument as defining the rights
and liabilities of the parties involved. Protection of the injured
party can best be accomplished by saving the malpractice cause of
action through use of a Pierringer type release.
III. NEGLIGENCE
The court was called upon to decide a number of cases affecting
development of the Wisconsin doctrine of comparative negligence.
Among the major issues were the problems of apportionment of
negligence, jury enlightenment, active-passive negligence, negligent
arrest and third party actions aginst co-employees. Generically
speaking, the court relied on precedent, however the cases raise a
number of issues which may meet acceptance in the future.
Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,"2 considered the
ability of the court to change the apportionment of negligence
determined by the jury. The case involved an automobile intersec-
tion collision where the jury apportioned 65 percent of the causal
negligence to the plaintiff. Plaintiff's auto struck defendant's auto
in an intersection controlled by flashing lights-plaintiff proceeded
through the yellow caution light and struck defendant. The court
concluded that the defendant was negligent as to lookout and right-
of-way, but the plaintiff was negligent as to speed and lookout.
Plaintiff contended on appeal that the jury's verdict was grossly
out of line with the facts of the case. In rejecting plaintiffs conten-
tion, the court quoted Sailing v. Wallestad3 as follows:
In the great majority of automobile accident cases the compari-
81. Id. at 407, 204 N.W.2d at 494.
82. 56 Wis. 2d 725, 203 N.W.2d 34 (1973).
83. 32 Wis. 2d 435, 145 N.W.2d 725 (1966).
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son of negligence is for the jury, and the instances in which a
court can rule as a matter of law that the negligence of a plaintiff
equaled or exceeded that of a defendant are extremely rare.84
Review by the appellate court is considerably restricted where the
trial court specifically approves the jury apportionment in ruling
on motions after verdict. While the Smith case did not deal with
the specific issue, it causes one to question the ability of the trial
court to alter the jury's apportionment. The trial court may change
the answer to the apportionment question only if the court can find
as a matter of law that one party is not negligent or that the parties
are equally negligent. The court may also affect the apportionment
by granting a new trial where the verdict is grossly dispropor-
tionate or contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Whether
the supreme court would allow the trial court or itself to undertake
to determine a reasonable comparison of causal negligence when
the jury's determination is found to be excessive with respect to one
of the parties is not certain. Such a procedure would amount to a
Powers rule applied to the jury apportionment as advocated by
then Justice Hallows in his concurring opinion in Lawver v. Park
Falls.' While the approach the court will take on alteration of the
apportionment must be left to speculation, where the trial court
approves the apportionment the court has reiterated its "hands-
off" attitude.
A somewhat related problem is whether the jury should be
informed of the effect of its answers to the special verdict questions
as to ultimate recovery of the parties. The question arose out of
counsel's remarks during closing argument to the effect that the
jury should not consider a 50-50 apportionment because that kind
of verdict would do a grave injustice (note that the case was tried
under the "greater than" comparative negligence statute"6 which
would preclude recovery under a 50-50 negligence apportionment).
In Kobelinski v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.,87 the
84. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 752, 755, 203 N.W.2d 34,
36-37 (1973).
85. 35 Wis. 2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68 (1967).
86. WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1969):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
87. 56 Wis. 2d 504, 202 N.W.2d 415 (1972).
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court indicated its disapproval of the remarks but held that the
statements did not constitute prejudicial error.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is
reversible error to inform the jury of the effect of its answers to
special verdict questions upon the ultimate right of recovery, either
expressly or by necessary implication. It is improper to inform
them of the effect of its answers either by argument of counsel or
by instruction of the court.8 8 The court has gone so far as to hold
that it is error to read the comparative negligence statute to the
jury because of the prejudicial effect of informing the jurors of the
effect of their answers.89 In spite of the line of precedent, Chief
Justice Hallows dissented in Kobelinski stating:
I think the rule should be changed so that a jury can be told the
meaning of their verdict. . . . The court should be allowed to
instruct the jury, not only of the effect of their apportionment
answer, but that if it is not sustained by the evidence it may be
set aside or modified by the court. If the jury knew the full extent
and the limitation of its role and the role of the court in the trial
of a lawsuit, their verdicts would be more realistic and just."0
The rationale against "jury enlightenment" is that the purpose
of the special verdict is to secure a direct answer to the question
submitted to the jury free from bias or prejudice in favor of or
against either party. Concern for jury enlightenment has developed
under the doctrine of comparative negligence, especially where the
percentage of causal negligence attributed to each party ap-
proaches 50 percent. It is felt that justice would be better served if
the jury were informed that a party 49 percent negligent will re-
cover 51 percent of the damage awarded while the other party is
barred from recovery. However, the special verdict was developed
to focus the attention of the jury on ultimate facts and to move
away from this view amounts to reverting to a general verdict
procedure. To accept the reasoning of Chief Justice Hallows' dis-
sent is the first step in appraising the jury of the ultimate effect of
recovery. Taken to its logical conclusion, if the jury is to be advised
of the effect of its apportionment, by necessary implication it
88. Banderob v. Wisconsin Central R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 113 N.W. 738 (1907); Ander-
son v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 271 N.W. 844 (1937); Pecor v. Home Indemnity Co., 234 Wis.
407, 291 N.W. 313 (1940); Erb v. Mutual Service Casualty Co., 20 Wis. 2d 530, 123 N.W.2d
493 (1963).
89. De Groot v. Van Akken, 225 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
90. Kobelinski v. Milwaukee & S. Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 504, 526, 202 N.W.2d
415, 428 (1972).
[Vol. 57
TERM OF THE COURT
should be appraised of all interests which will affect a party's
"take-home" verdict, i.e., attorney's fees, subrogation rights,
workman's compensation claims, set-offs, etc. At least for the
present, in light of Kobelinski, Wisconsin juries will not be in-
formed of the effect of their answers to special verdict questions.
Another case affecting the comparison of negligence is
Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.,"1 where the
court abolished the distinction of active and passive negligence.
The plaintiff was injured when alighting from defendant's bus,
stopped at an uneven and defective curb. Plaintiff brought suit
against the Transport Company who in turn brought a third party
action against the City of Milwaukee for contribution, or in the
alternative, indemnity based on the defective curb and sidewalk.
The trial court sustained the city's demurrer.
On appeal the Transport Company urged the court to recognize
the active-passive distinction and thereby create a right to full
indemnity for the tortfeasor whose negligence contributed to the
injury but was "passive." "Active" negligence denotes some posi-
tive act or some failure in a duty of operation equivalent to a
positive act, whereas "passive" negligence denotes something that
should have been done.12 The court indicated that it was difficult
to see how the distinction would apply to the facts presented and
further stated that the all-or-nothing basis of indemnity would be
contrary to the policy of contribution between tortfeasors based on
comparative negligence. In Bielski v. Schulze93 the distinction be-
tween gross and ordinary negligence was discarded because the
distinction worked inequitably in the field of contribution and in-
demnity, and only by treating the conduct in terms of degree can
a fair and equitable result be reached through comparison. "For
the same reasons that the distinction between 'gross' and 'ordinary'
negligence was abolished in Bielski, [the court] .. .now reject[s]
* a distinction between 'passive' and 'active' negligence as a
basis for indemnity between co-tort-feasors."94
A number of cases decided this term considered the liability of
co-employees in third-party actions where the plaintiff had already
recovered under workman's compensation. The cases presenting
91. Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202 N.W.2d
268 (1972).
92. 65 C.J.S., Negligence sec. 1 (14) at 460.
93. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
94. Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 387, 202
N.W.2d 268, 272 (1972).
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these issues include: Pitrowski v. Taylor;95 Anderson v. Green Bay
Hockey, Inc.; 6 Lampada v. State Sand & Gravel;" and Candler
v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.98
The court in Pitrowski v. Taylor, supra, reiterated its position
stated in Wasley v. Kosmatka9 that the standard of care under the
safe-place statute 0 applies to employers through its agents but the
statutory language does not recognize that supervisory personnel
may be held personally liable. In Pitrowski, the plaintiff was in-
jured when struck by steel falling from a fork lift operated by a
co-employee. After receiving workman's compensation benefits, a
third-party suit was commenced against Taylor, the fork lift opera-
tor, Cullen, the president of the employer corporation, and Larsen,
the plaintiff's supervisor. The trial court found that all three defen-
dants were engaged in the operation by which plaintiff was injured,
and reasoned that the duty of Larsen and Cullen was to furnish a
safe place of employment. Holding that the trial court erred in
determining the standard of care, the court stated that the duty
complying with the safe-place statute is on the employer and this
duty cannot be delegated to officers or employees.
Their [officers and employees] liability must rest upon common-
law failure to exercise ordinary care toward an employee to
whom, under the circumstances, they owed a duty-not upon the
increased standard of care that the safe-place law imposes on an
employer.' 0'
The plaintiff in Anderson v. Green Bay Hockey Inc., supra, lost
an eye and suffered extensive injuries to his cheekbone, mouth and
teeth when struck by a hockey puck propelled out of the rink by
Bobby Hull. Hull's team, the Chicago Blackhawks, was playing an
exhibition game in the Brown County Arena where plaintiff An-
derson was tending the doors as a civil defense employee of Brown
County. After collecting workman's compensation benefits, a
third-party suit was brought against Green Bay Hockey who had
leased the arena from the county, the arena manager, and the
members of the Brown County Board's arena committee. The
plaintiff relied on two theories: violation of the safe-place statute
95. 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972).
96. 56 Wis. 2d 763, 203 N.W.2d 79 (1973).
97. 58 Wis. 2d 315, 206 N.W.2d 138 (1973).
98. 57 Wis. 2d 85, 203 N.W.2d 659 (1973).
99. 50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 821 (1971).
100. WIs. STAT. § 101.11(]) (a) (1971).
101. Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 627-628, 201 N.W.2d 52, 58 (1972).
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and common-law negligence. Appeal was taken from the trial
court's overruling of a demurrer. The supreme court held that it
was clear from Wesley and Pitrowski that the complaint could not
state a cause of action under the safe-place law, and it is equally
clear from Pitrowski that the complaint does state a common-law
cause of action. As in Pitrowski the case was remanded to the trial
court from determination of whether the supervisory employees
failed to exercise ordinary care toward a fellow employee under
common-law negligence principles.
Closely related to these questions is whether the "exclusive
remedy" provision of the workman's compensation statute12 pro-
hibits an employee from bringing an action for personal injuries
against a supervisory co-employee. In Lampada v. State Sand &
Gravel Co., supra, the opinion stated that the "exclusive remedy"
provision applies only to employers and their insurance carriers
and that a supervisory co-employee may be joined as a third party'
defendant rather than a defendant in the original action. The court
concluded that the "exclusive remedy" section does not bar suits
against supervisory co-employees based on common-law negli-
gence,103 however, the section does bar actions for indemnity"4 or
contribution 5 against a third-party defendant-employer.
Candler v. Hardware Mut. Ins., supra, another case involving
a third party suit, deserves mention. The issue was whether a mem-
ber of a partnership is an employer of the employees of the partner-
ship or a co-employee for purposes of third-party suits brought
under section 102.29(1)06 of the workmen's compensation act. The
102. WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1971) providing:
Where such conditions (conditions imposing liability under the workmen's compen-
sation statute) exist the right to recovery of compensation pursuant to this chapter
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and the workmen's compensation
insurance carrier.
103. See Haeverman v. Feldman, 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W. 580 (1936); Wasley v. Kos-
matka, 50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 827 (1971); Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201
N.W.2d 52 (1972); Anderson v. Green Bay Hockey, Inc., 56 Wis. 2d 763, 203 N.W.2d 79
(1973).
104. Grede Foundries, Inc. v. Price Erecting Co., 38 Wis. 2d 502, 157 N.W.2d 559
(1968); Engel v. Prindel, 27 Wis. 2d 456, 134 N.W.2d 404 (1965).
105. Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis. 236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957).
106. WIs. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1971):
The making of a claim for compensation against an employer or compensation
insurer for the injury or death of an employe shall not affect the right of the employe,
his personal representative, or other person entitled to bring action, to make claim
or maintain an action, in tort against any other party for such injury or death,
hereinafter referred to as a third party . ...
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
plaintiff, an employee of the partnership, after receiving work-
men's compensation for his injuries, brought a third-party suit
against one of the partners for damages resulting from that part-
ner's negligence. The court held the member of a partnership was
an employer and therefore when the employee recovered work-
men's compensation benefits from his employer under section
102.03(2) the partner as one of his employers is not subject to
further third-party liability.0 7 The court founded its decision on the
aggregate as distinct from the entity theory of partnership. Under
the aggregate theory a partnership is an association of individuals,
rather than a distinct legal entity. All partners are co-owners of the
business with equal rights in its management and control. Thus the
court found "no incident of the employer-employee relationship
lacking, and under the partnership act members of the partnership
are, therefore, the employers of the employees of the partner-
ship."'0 8 As to members of a partnership workman's compensation
is the exclusive remedy of their employees.
Also in the negligence field, the court considered the "degree
of control test" as related to the safe-place standard of care in
Berger v. Metropolitan Sewage Comm.' Two workmen died from
asphyxiation and drowning while working for a construction firm
under contract to the Milwaukee County Sewerage Commission
for the construction of sewers. A third-party suit was initiated by
the widows of the deceased workmen for wrongful death, alleging
that the sewerage commission violated the safe-place statute in that
it owned the place where the accident occurred thereby being own-
ers of a place of employment, and further, that decedents were
frequenters within the contemplation of the statute. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs
appealed.
The issue which determined the outcome of the appeal was
whether the independent contractor retained complete control and
custody of a safe place. 10 Although the sewerage commission
maintained a field office at the construction site for the purpose
of having its employee-engineers conduct inspections to see that
107. Candler v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 85, 91, 203 N.W.2d 659, 662
(1973).
108. Id. at 88, 203 N.W.2d at 661.
109. 56 Wis. 2d 741, 203 N.W.2d 87 (1973).
110. Caldwell v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966);
Burmesiter v. Damrow, 273 Wis. 568, 79 N.W.2d 87 (1956); Lee v. Junkans, 18 Wis. 2d
56, 117 N.W.2d 614 (1962).
[Vol. 57
TERM OF THE COURT
the work proceeded according to contract specifications, the court
held that inspection alone did not constitute such control as to
subject the commission to liability and hence did not raise a triable
issue. For this portion the court considered Potter v. Kenosha,"
which presented a fact situation similar to that of the present case,
which held:
. . . that when an owner turns over to an independent contractor
the complete control and custody of a safe place, whereon or
whereunder the contractor creates a place of employment for the
purpose of filling the terms of the contract, the owner reserving
no right of supervision or control of the work excepting that of
inspection or to change the plan with reference to the construc-
tion to be furnished, if thereafter in the performance of the work
under the contract the premises are changed by the contractor
and as a result a hazardous condition is created, the owner does
not become liable to the contractor's employee injured as a con-
sequence of such hazardous condition while acting in the scope
of his employment."'
In explaining the rule in Potter the court stated that the purpose
of determining who is in control of the construction, there is a
distinction between restrictions or specifications placed on the end
result and the manner in which the work is actually accomplished.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held inspection duties may
amount to the requisite degree of control if such duties amount to
the ability to direct how the job is to be done. 13 However, where
the employees, as in Berger, merely enforced the terms of the
contract by inspecting the work product of the contractor, a find-
ing that such inspection manifested the requisite degree of control
would be tantamount to holding that detailed specifications them-
selves indicate a degree of supervision or control which would
impose liability under Potter. In recognizing a distinction in con-
trol over end results by means of inspection and actual direction
of work performance, the court seems to have created a factual
distinction. The standard applied in Berger is somewhat confusing
since the case was decided on a motion for summary judgment
indicating that no question of fact remained to be tried. It must
be concluded that for a plaintiff to get this question to the jury,
more than mere inspection must be alleged, but the question of
I II. 268 Wis. 361, 68 N.W.2d 4 (1955).
112. Id. at 372, 68 N.W.2d at 10.
113. Frew v. Dupons Construction Co., 37 Wis. 2d 676, 155 N.W.2d 595 (1968).
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when "inspection" becomes "direction" is left to future litigation.
In one of the most interesting cases this term, by a 4-3 decision
the court in Clemer v. Quarberg"4 found a cause of action for
"negligent arrest." The plaintiff commenced an action to recover
damages sustained arising out of an attempted arrest by the defen-
dant an undercover police officer for the city of Racine. The plain-
tiff went to an abandoned farm to release his racing pigeons. This
farm was under observation at the time by the Racine police as a
storage site for a large quantity of marijuana. The officer's appear-
ance was such as to blend with the subculture generally associated
with the use of narcotics, and as a result, when the defendant
confronted plaintiff returning to his car, plaintiff believed the offi-
cer to be a "crazed farmer". Thus, plaintiff refused to follow defen-
dant's direction to put his hands on the car. Defendant then struck
the plaintiff with the butt of his pistol, at which time the plaintiff
jumped into his car and drove off. The plaintiff proceeded home
on two flat tires which resulted from defenant's pistol shots.
The court sustained a jury finding that the defendant disguised
as he was so as to conceal his identify as an officer, failed to make
a reasonable effort to inform the plaintiff of his identity. Defendant
was negligent not in his use of force but in his failure to take the
steps necessary to prevent the use of such force in the first instance.
The action here was one for negligence. The holding in Celmer
must be distinguished from cases dealing with "excessive use of
force" by police officers"' since in those cases the injured party was
aware of the identity of the other party as a police officer. Answer-
ing the question of whether "a police officer, operating in a dis-
guise, although acting in the line of duty, who confronts a citizen
who has no reason to know of the officer's official identity, should
be held civilly liable for the failure to make a reasonable effort to
inform the citizen of his identity,"" 6 the court concluded that the
officer is liable for the damages sustained by plaintiff.
The reasoning of the decision seems to hinge on the fact that
police officers have certain rights and privileges in their dealings
with the public. These rights and privileges do not attach to the
officer as a private citizen, but have legal effect only when the
114. 56 Wis. 2d 581, 203 N.W.2d 45 (1973).
115. Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960); Larson v. Lester, 259
Wis. 440, 49 N.W.2d 414 (1951); Matczak v. Mathews, 265 Wis. I, 60 N.W.2d 352 (1953);
Kalb v. Luce, 228 Wis. 519, 279 N.W. 685, 280 N.W. 725 (1938).
116. Celmer v. Quarberg, 56 Wis. 2d 581, 588, 203 N.W.2d 45, 49 (1973).
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police officer makes known that he is acting within his capacity as
a police officer. The court stated:
Quarberg (defendant) had the duty to make a reasonable effort
to inform the plaintiff of his identity as a peace officer before
Quarberg exercised the rights and privileges of that identity
... . No particular declaration is required; the test, being one
for the jury, requiring the officer, where the person does not
know or have any reason to know of his official identity, to make
a reasonable attempt to convey that fact. When the officer fails
to so inform, yet exercises his privileges flowing from such ident-
ity, the question of negligence arises."7
A number of questions are raised by the Celmer decision as
evidenced by the strong dissent of Justice Robert Hansen, who was
joined by Justices Beilfuss and Hanley. Initially, a problem arises
from the mixture of negligent and intentional torts presented in the
case. "The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the arresting
officer 'negligently used excessive force' in making the arrest.""'
While the court distinguished the "excessive force" cases on the
basis of knowledge of the officer's identity, the striking of the
plaintiff under facts such as these amounts to the intentional tort
of battery. It follows that when a peace officer fails to make his
identity known while attempting to arrest an individual, his use of
force under those circumstances would be "excessive." This rea-
soning would also be more compatible with the holding of Schulze
v. Kleeber"9 that a police officer, in making a lawful arrest, is
civilly liable only for battery or use of excessive force. However,
in Celmer, the trial court as a matter of law held that excessive
force was not used.
The trial court also considered the question of contributory
negligence, concluding that it would be improper under these facts
to submit a question of contributory negligence to the jury. The
supreme court left open the question of whether the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff would be available as a defense in subse-
quent suits brought under this "negligent arrest" theory. If the
theory of suit is one of negligence, the Wisconsin policy favoring
apportionment of negligence by comparison would seem to favor
the availability of the defense of an appropriate instruction if so
requested.
117. Id. at 590, 203 N.W.2d at 50.
118. Id. at 597, 203 N.W.2d at 54.
119. Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960).
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Essentially, the court has balanced the right of the individual
to know he is being confronted by a police officer, with the need
for disguised, under-cover officers in crime prevention. It held that
the officer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to inform the
citizen of his identity before the officer takes further action. A
reasonable attempt to inform does not amount to actual knowledge
on the part of the citizen, but does require a showing by the officer
that the citizen had reason to know or that a reasonable attempt
to so inform was made.
Later in the term Nelson v. Milwaukee' seemed to. indicate
that Celmer should be viewed as an unusual case and strictly lim-
ited to its facts. In Nelson an amended complaint in an action
against the City of Milwaukee alleged that the plaintiff was "negli-
gently" confined by city police. The trial court found the allegation
that the plaintiff was "arrested and imprisoned" demonstrated that
the cause of action was essentially one for the intentional tort of
false imprisonment. This finding was approved on appeal relying
on Strong v. Milwaukee' which held that section 895.43(3)1" pre-
cluded the bringing of a suit against a political corporation for the
intentional torts of its officers and employees, thus making a com-
plaint containing such allegations demurrable. It seems doubtful
that a different result would have been reached on the negligence
allegations if the suit had been brought against the police officers,
individually, rather than the city. The combination of Celmer and
Nelson in the same court term would seem to indicate that the
liability of police officers for negligent arrest has not been signifi-




In Zimmerman v. Brennan,' the court dealt with the growing
120. 57 Wis. 2d 166, 203 N.W.2d 684 (1973).
121. 38 Wis. 2d 564, 157 N.W.2d 619 (1968).
122. WIs. STAT. § 895.43(3) (1971):
No suit shall be brought against any political corporation, governmental subdivision
or any agency thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or
employees nor shall any suit be brought against such fire company, corporation,
subdivision or agency or against its officers, officials, agents or employees for acts
done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions.
I. 56 Wis. 2d 623, 202 N.W.2d 923 (1973).
[Vol. 57
